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Factors That Limit Compliance With
Low-Impact Recommendations
James A. Harding
William T. Borrie
David N. Cole

Abstract—Despite widespread efforts to minimize resource impacts, a number of remote areas continue to suffer from poor
backcountry practices. Research to evaluate the effectiveness of
low-impact communication strategies as they relate to recall of
messages (Cole and others 1997) measured whether or not
recreationists were aware of appropriate behavior given certain
scenarios; it did not measure actual compliance. Partially in response to the results of that study, it has been hypothesized that a
lack of information is not necessarily the only limiting factor in
complying with specific low-impact recommendations. We propose
a four-stage model of factors that might help to explain some
noncompliance with backcountry low-impact recommendations
where information is not the limiting factor.

The study of noncompliance with low-impact recommendations may be useful on any number of fronts. Certainly,
there is the issue of natural resource degradation from
recreation impacts. Soil and vegetative impacts from improper camping techniques or inappropriate trail behavior
are all important concerns. Similarly, inappropriate behavior during camping or hiking experiences can lead to impacts on wildlife and water resources. Of course, resource
impacts are not the only issue of concern—social impacts too
may result from noncompliance with low-impact recommendations. A host of visitor experience issues might arise, such
as camping too close to other parties, to the trail or to water
can all affect visitor experiences. Issues such as crowding
and solitude can be affected by noncompliance. Additionally, improper disposal of human waste can be both a health
hazard and can result in a negative recreation experience.
Finally, managerial and policy issues might arise as a result
of noncompliance where certain areas may be closed or
restricted to use due to complaints from other users or
severe resource impacts.
Overall, this proposed model should be viewed as an
opportunity to understand the social and psychological
processes at work within the recreational setting, particularly as they relate to choice and decision factors. This

In: Cole, David N.; McCool, Stephen F.; Borrie, William T.; O’Loughlin,
Jennifer, comps. 2000. Wilderness science in a time of change conference—
Volume 4: Wilderness visitors, experiences, and visitor management; 1999
May 23–27; Missoula, MT. Proceedings RMRS-P-15-VOL-4. Ogden, UT: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station.
James A. Harding is a doctoral student in Recreation Management at the
University of Montana, 462 SC, School of Forestry, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT 59812 U.S.A. William T. Borrie is Assistant Professor of
Recreation Management, University of Montana. David N. Cole is a Research
Scientist with the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute, U.S. Forest
Service, Missoula, MT.

198

suggests that a number of factors influence our decisions
and, ultimately, our behaviors.
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action
(TRA) has been widely used to explain behavior in terms of
intentions (Figure 1). However, we recognize that a host of
other factors may intervene prior to intention that will
subsequently affect behavior. Petty and Cacioppo’s (1981)
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) acknowledged that
certain psychological constructs, such as motivation and
ability to process information, may affect an individual’s
attitudes, which in turn, may affect an individual’s intentions toward behavior. Each of these examples can be used
in the context of noncompliance with low-impact recommendations. With the TRA, we can envision a situation where
one’s own attitude toward some behavior outweighs a corresponding subjective norm, resulting in noncompliance with
some low-impact recommendation. Similarly, under the
ELM, an individual may be exposed to some low-impact
recommendation through written media on a bulletin board,
and, indeed the individual can be considered knowledgeable
of specific low-impact recommendations; however, he or she
lacks either the motivation or the ability to process that
information. The end result in this situation might also be
noncompliance. The four-stage model we propose uses the
foundations of both the TRA and the ELM, however, we
attempt to specify certain sub-categories.
While both the TRA and the ELM offer ways of examining
factors that ultimately affect behavior, our proposed model
focuses more on the cognitive processes and social forces that
affect decision-making. This model builds on both the TRA
and the ELM, however the difference lies in the specifics of
focus. The first stage of our model focuses on the interpretation of the situation. At this level we are interested in
perceptual abilities and familiarity with the meanings environmental stimuli. The second stage of the model examines

Attitude toward
the behavior

Relative importance of
attitudinal and normative
considerations.

Intention

Behavior

Subjective Norm

Figure 1—An adapted model of the Theory of Reasoned Action from
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).
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information retrieval strategies. At this level our concern is
the accessibility of attitudes, information and beliefs about
low-impact behaviors. Moving to the third stage, judgment
formation, we are primarily interested in the ethics that
guide behavior choice. In the final stage, expressions of
behavior represent a final decision-stage with explicit social
factors that link behaviors with perceptions of other people.
Factors such as social identity guide behavioral decisions, in
that, in some instances people perform behaviors so as to be
consistent with some positive social identity.
Cognitive psychology is an approach to psychology that
emphasizes the study of mental processes (Goldstein 1996);
specifically it is concerned with mental processes involving
perceptions, pattern recognition, memory retrieval, decision-making and judgment. Some cognitive functions that
might come into play in noncompliance situations are a
failure to recognize the need for a low-impact decision,
misidentification of environmental cues and an inappropriate recommendation retrieved from memory. Social psychology deals with situations where the attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors of other people affect our own attitudes, beliefs
and behaviors. Much social psychology research “has been
framed in terms of conformity” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993)
and thus is well-suited to studying issues of noncompliance.
In the context of following low-impact recommendations,
social psychology might deal with those situations where our
camping or hiking companions somehow influence our decisions, judgments and expressions of behavior leading to
noncompliance.
Thus, knowledge of appropriate low-impact recommendations is not necessarily the only limiting factor in
compliance. Cognitive and social factors can intervene between identifying the need for low-impact practices and,
ultimately, practicing the correct behavior. Where
recreationists are aware of and have a favorable attitude
toward specific low-impact recommendations, other intervening factors, such as group influences, may occasionally
prevent compliance.
This model identifies four distinct stages. However, each
of the stages relates to at least one of the other stages. Thus,
our four-part model details the interconnectedness of each of
these parts, and each of these parts is outlined in the
paragraphs that follow.

Interpretation of the Situation _____
The first stage of the model is what we have labeled
Interpretation of the Situation. At this stage, recreationists
must scan and interpret the physical and social conditions of
an area. In this sense, they must be able to identify resource
impacts and how other people may or may not affect the
recreation experience. A problem occurs when people are
unable or unwilling to correctly identify salient physical and
social features of a site.
On the one hand, people can misinterpret certain environmental cues that are critical to identifying low-impact recommendations. For instance, when trying to select a campsite, campers might first try to determine the amount of use
a site receives and thus the need for low-impact practices.
How do they determine whether a site receives low, medium
or high use based on visible impacts? This can be very
challenging task even for moderately experienced campers.
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-15-VOL-4. 2000

Keep in mind that this is just the first stage in our four-stage
model. Unless something in the physical or social environment triggers the need to choose and implement a lowimpact practice, recreationists will not enact a low-impact
behavior.
One technique that appears to have some application in
the identification of salient physical or social features is the
Signal Detection Theory. Signal Detection Theory was proposed as part of military training where radar technicians
had to correctly identify visual stimuli on their radar
screens. In low-impact scenarios, we would likely be most
concerned with whether people could identify some appropriate environmental stimulus, such as fragile vegetation
or presence of wildlife. The basic premise of signal detection
theory assumes that there is a two-way decision with four
possible results: Stimulus—Yes, Stimulus—No, Noise—Yes,
Noise—No.
The stimulus in this case represents environmental cues
that truly occur in reality. Noise represents the absence of a
true environmental cue. People respond either with a yes or
no when faced with either stimulus or noise. Thus, people
can respond either correctly or incorrectly to both stimuli
and noise. Typically, we are concerned with a response
scenario, which can be translated into “Yes” = perceived
stimulus is present and “No” = perceived stimulus is absent.
Likewise, there are two possible stimuli scenarios: “Noise” =
no stimuli and “Stimuli” = presence of stimuli. Figure 2
illustrates this relationship. The “Quiet” box represents a
situation in which the individual correctly observes that
there is no stimulus, when in reality a stimulus is absent.
The “Miss” box represents a situation in which the individual incorrectly observes that there is no stimulus, when
in reality a stimulus is present. A “False Alarm” represents
a scenario in which the individual incorrectly observes a
stimulus, when in reality a stimulus is absent. Finally, a
“Correct Detection” occurs when the individual correctly
observes a stimulus, when in reality a stimulus is present.
Each of the incorrect assessments has negative ramifications. The “Miss” box is analogous to a Type II error where
one fails to identify a true difference. The “False Alarm” box
is analogous to a more serious, Type I error where one
believes a difference exists when none, in fact, does. However, as we shall see, the relative severity of a negative
consequence changes in a low-impact scenario.
A specific example of a low-impact behavior can illustrate
the connection. Suppose our behavior is campsite selection
where a host of criteria should be employed to choose an
optimal campsite. One of these criteria is the likelihood of
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Figure 2—Standard variables explaining the Signal Detection Theory.
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disturbing wildlife. This criterion might be derived by visually observing or hearing wildlife in the area or perhaps
observing fresh signs of wildlife (scat, rubbings, tracks, etc.).
Any one of these could serve as a stimulus or signal. For
illustrative purposes, we’ll choose observing animal tracks
as a stimulus. Figure 3 illustrates how animal tracks might
be used in a signal detection scenario. Consistent with all
examples of the Signal Detection Theory, only two of the four
possible outcomes result in good or correct decisions. In this
example, the two correct decisions would be either correctly
selecting a good campsite or correctly identifying a bad
campsite. The situation when our camper correctly identified a good campsite, resulted because he/she searched for
tracks, but none were present in reality.
In this situation, the camper would presumably select this
site to set up camp, assuming all other variables were
similarly acceptable. Under different circumstances, the
camper correctly identified a bad campsite because he/she
searched for tracks and actually found some. In this situation, the camper would presumably continue searching for
an acceptable campsite, as the presence of animal tracks
would eliminate this one from consideration. The relative
severity of an incorrect decision can be seen with this
example. The lower left box, which typically represents a
“False Alarm” or a Type I error, would result in no additional
impact to the campsite because the camper would reject it
(albeit for no good reason). Similarly, the upper right box,
which typically represents a “Miss” or a Type II error might
result in unnecessary damage to the campsite because the
camper found nothing wrong using it.
It should be noted that the Signal Detection Theory
presumes a situation of high involvement, where the individual actively searches for information or a specific stimulus. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that, particular to
the previously mentioned campsite-selection scenario, several different criteria or stimuli would have to be considered
before a campsite would ultimately be selected for use. Thus,
searching for animal tracks would represent just one of
these criteria. Others that might be considered are distance
from water, potential to disturb other campers, fragility of
vegetation and soil, etc. As most low-impact behaviors are

similarly complex, a host of criteria or stimuli would likewise
be considered for each one under the signal detection theory.
So the question then arises of whether individuals would
systematically process each criterion in a signal detection
scenario, or would this task prove too complex? Additionally,
it is not clear how effectively Signal Detection Theory would
handle situations involving multiple criteria. In fact, perceiving only one criterion, in situations where many should
be considered, can certainly lead to instances of noncompliance. However, despite these drawbacks, Signal Detection
Theory does represent an appropriate concept for the first
stage of the model in instances where decisions are relatively non-complex and limited to a singular stimulus.

Information Retrieval
Strategies ______________________
Concomitant with interpreting the situation comes identifying the need for a low-impact decision, and thus occurs
very early in this four-stage model. However, correctly
identifying the need for a low-impact decision does not
ensure that one will be made. Of paramount concern at this
stage is the ability to retrieve salient information about lowimpact behaviors from memory. In short, how accessible are
our attitudes, information and beliefs about low-impact
behavior? Even though we may assume that wildland visitors are well-informed about correct low-impact behaviors,
we should not assume that knowledge is completely and
accurately retrieved from memory. One way in which a
failure in memory may occur is when individuals may be
relying on a heuristic, or shortcut, for information retrieval.
According to Taylor and Fiske (1978), we are all “cognitive
misers,” meaning that we do what we can to simplify mental
processes. A heuristic is one method of simplifying mental
processes, and one type of a heuristic is the availability
heuristic.
An example of this might occur when an individual is
attempting to recall the appropriate behavior for more than
one person walking across a trail-less open area. One lowimpact recommendation is for the individuals to spread out,
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Figure 3—Using presence/absence of animal tracks and Signal Detection
Theory to identify good or bad campsites.
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so as to disperse their impacts. However, an individual’s
most frequent (and hence most available) memory is that of
hiking single file, and this becomes their chosen behavior.
In this scenario, the individual correctly interprets the
situation as one in which a low-impact behavior is appropriate. Further, he or she identifies the need for a low-impact
behavior. However, the behavior accessed from memory is
not appropriate given environmental conditions. Thus, incomplete or inaccurate retrieval of memory can result in a
choice of inappropriate low-impact behavior.
Another way to look at the role of information retrieval
strategies is through certain choice rules. Psychologists
have distinguished two broad categories of choice rules:
compensatory and non-compensatory rules. Abelson and
Levi (1985) extensively detail each of these rules. Briefly
though, compensatory rules are those where individuals are
allowed to adjust and make trade-offs among attributes.
Non-compensatory rules do not allow trade-offs between
alternatives.
It is worth mentioning that a great deal of cognition
research is based on consumer decision-making; the same is
true for these two types of choice rules. Studies of choice
rules often place individuals in situations in which they are
asked to choose one product from two or more alternatives
based on a number of different product criteria (for example,
cost, features, functionality, etc.). It seems reasonable that
many of the low-impact criteria, such as all of those associated with campsite selection, should be substitutable for
product-related criteria. An additional point worth mentioning is that all choice rules serve as models only among
situations with well-defined alternatives (such as, Campsite
A, Campsite B, Campsite C, etc.). In this respect,
recreationists must be able to identify and apply the same
criteria across each campsite. Similarly, a great deal of study
has been given to decision-making in situations in which the
alternatives are not so clearly defined (Tversky and
Kahneman 1982).

Judgment Formation ____________
How do individuals ultimately act in response to their
attitudes, memory, environmental cues and judgments? A
number of factors influence our judgments. For example,
cognitive (What do I remember choosing last time?) and
social-psychological (What would someone important to
me choose?) factors direct the decision about the correct
behavior.
A critical aspect of choice of behavior is one’s ethics.
Different models of ethical decision-making exist, such as an
ethic of justice and an ethic of care. Carol Gilligan (1982)
contrasts these in great detail. For a summary of each, refer
to table 1.
An individual might act according to an ethic of justice if
he or she is concerned with equal treatment. An ethic of care
promotes equal consideration rather than equal treatment.
The distinction between these two can be illustrated with an
often-cited ethical dilemma involving two injured people. In
this case a doctor roaming through the rubble of an aftermath of an earthquake, comes across two injured people.
Each person has a leg injury. While one person has a
relatively superficial laceration requiring several stitches,
the other person suffers from a compound fracture of the
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-15-VOL-4. 2000

Table 1—Comparison between an ethic of justice and
an ethic of care.
Ethic of justice

Ethic of care

Reason
Necessity
Universalization
Abstraction

Emotion
Contingency
Particularity
Situatedness

femur. The doctor only has two doses of morphine left and he
must deal with both injured people. Under equal treatment,
each person would receive one dose of morphine regardless
of their relative levels of pain. Under equal consideration,
the needs of each injured person would be considered against
the needs of the other and the amount of relief available. In
this instance, the person with the compound fracture would
get both doses of morphine, because his/her pain is more
severe and two doses will do more for this person than one
will do for each of them.
This distinction is also evident in a campsite selection
example. An ethic of justice would promote the position that
all campsites should be treated equally regardless of amount
of use or environmental condition. Conversely, an ethic of
care would promote equal consideration rather than equal
treatment. Equal consideration is contextual where the
particular characteristics of each campsite would be considered. Campsite selection using an ethic of care would lead the
individual to consider the relative merits and impacts of each
campsite and act in the best interest of all the campsites.
Ethics are not descriptive, they are prescriptive. That is to
say, ethics do not tell us the way the world is—they tell us the
way the world ought to be. The difference between “is” and
“ought” plays a critical role in many cases where the natural
world intersects with policy. It is clear the way the natural
world is, but it is not always clear how we ought to behave
with respect to the natural world. Low-impact recommendations, themselves, represent a certain type of environmental
ethic, and these recommendations may be rooted in an ethic
of justice or ethic of care depending on the individual.
Despite the fact that we may use our ethics to determine
what we think we ought to do, what we think we ought to do
may not always be consistent with low-impact recommendations. Thus, it may be an ethic that produces an inappropriate behavior. Specifically, if the ethic one intends to follow is
rooted in equal treatment rather than equal consideration
some areas may suffer needless resource damage.

Expressions of Behavior _________
At this stage of the model, an individual attempts to
determine which behavior is most appropriate within the
context of both social and environmental factors. Social
pressure and social identity come into play, whereby the
individual weighs the appropriateness of his or her decision
with the image he or she will project to others. This harks
back to the Theory of Reasoned Action, in which a subjective
norm is one factor that influences behavioral intentions. An
example of the Theory of Reasoned Action at work in a
questionnaire item might be using a Likert scale to respond
to the following statement: “Most people who are important
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to me think that I should follow low-impact recommendations at all times.”
A specific example of the phenomenon of social identity
might be a rock climber who wants to be seen by other
climbers as environmentally conscious. His or her behavior
is adjusted to be consistent with that image. This climber
might go to great efforts to project an “environmentally
conscious” image in the presence of other climbers. While the
ultimate result of this climber’s efforts might be consistent
with low-impact recommendations, his/her motivations for
following these recommendations are not rooted in any
desire to protect the environment. This is important, because in situations where there exists no motivation to
project an “environmentally conscious” image, no intention
to behave appropriately will be there either.
Specifically, if a recreationist believes that certain behaviors will not be sanctioned by the rock climbing community,
there is little normative pressure to comply with a recommendation. Immanuel Kant noted the delicate balance involved in doing what is expected of us. If we do either more
or less than is required of us, we can be held accountable for
the consequences, but not otherwise. So the burden then
shifts to communicating clear and precise low-impact recommendations to minimize any ambiguity about what is expected of recreationists.
Finally, there undoubtedly are situations in which an
individual correctly interprets the situation, correctly recalls a recommendation from memory, and the appropriate
course of action is clear, yet, this individual still fails to put
into practice the appropriate behavior. At this last stage of
the model, a range of factors might make compliance with
low-impact recommendations difficult or impossible to follow. It is easy to imagine a backpacker who, faced with
fatigue or bad weather, decides to set up camp in a less than
ideal spot, even though he or she knows better. It also may
not be physically possible to carry out “correct behavior”—
such as when the only reasonably flat area for camping is
within 100 feet of an alpine lake.

So What? ______________________
Over 2,000 years ago, Plato developed the term akrasia to
describe a weakness of will that causes people to do what
they know is not right. This concept applies to some situations of noncompliance where people correctly identify appropriate low-impact behavior but fail to carry out this
behavior due to convenience or expedience. However, this
only represents some instances of noncompliance that occur
after cognitive and social psychological evaluations have
been made. As illustrated by the first three stages in the
model, there are a host of factors, such as situation interpretation, information retrieval, and judgment formation that
might limit compliance with low-impact recommendations.
A better understanding of the factors that may limit
noncompliance will lead to more effective strategies in behavior modification. Depending on which of the four factors is
limiting compliance, managers or community groups might
apply different persuasive strategies. For example, if correct
interpretation of the situation seems to be problematic, perhaps managers could pursue educational efforts that very
clearly illustrate techniques in reading the environment. In
those scenarios where individuals seem to have a problem
202

correctly retrieving information from memory, managers
could take steps to clarify recommendations and perhaps
make sure that these recommendations are introduced
through the central route. Where ethics are somehow inconsistent with a proper judgment, perhaps the groups responsible for communicating these messages should redouble
efforts at consolidating a cohesive set of outdoor ethics.
Finally, where appropriate behavior somehow falls short,
even where judgments are successfully interpreted, retrieved
and formed, perhaps managers should clarify and emphasize the importance of following low-impact recommendations 100% of the time.
It should be noted that this model remains theoretical at
this point. What remains to be done is to evaluate the
validity of the model. Indeed, decisions about what exactly
qualifies as noncompliance must be made prior to any
evaluations of the model. In this respect, it must be very
clear what constitutes noncompliance. Is noncompliance a
gross disregard for all low-impact recommendations? Or,
rather, does noncompliance result when just one recommendation is not followed? Or, perhaps, true noncompliance can
only be examined in terms of intention? Answers to these
questions must be obtained before any model testing can
proceed. However, we suspect a combination of observed
behavior coupled with self-reporting will either support or
refute the model. The idea is to emphasize different aspects
of the model and measure changes in behavior and selfreports. Ultimately, it is hoped that this model will help to
clarify subtle distinctions in the reasons for some people
failing to practice low-impact behaviors when knowledge of
those behaviors is not the limiting factor.
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